Beyond the Headlines: Investigating the August 2024 Riots (Dissertation)

This study presents a critical analysis of the news media portrayal of the UK riots of August 2024. I challenge the reductionist framing used to present the riots under the short-term reasoning of far-right extremism and social media misinformation, which, whilst important factors, overlook the influence of deeper social complexities. Through an analysis of 150 articles from GB News, the Daily Mail, and the BBC, alongside comprehensive theoretical research, I argue that crucial causal explanations - the history of anti-immigration sentiments, the pervasive power of discourse, and the growing reality of populist identity politics - were neglected. I contest that this incomplete presentation of the reality that accompanies the August riots, driven by political rhetoric and the news media, creates a divisive identity divide between the ‘rioters’ and ‘non-rioters’. I argue that this very narrative, evident in the Brexit leave campaign and the historical and political context of anti-immigration sentiments, contributed to the division between ‘immigrants’ and ‘rioters’, ultimately feeding into the instrumental concern that fuelled the violence: polarisation.  

This dissertation advocates for a nuanced understanding that engages with the lived realities of the rioters, emphasising the need for empirical research to address long-standing socio-political tensions over reductionist framing that leads to uninformed public opinion, a dangerous oversight amid such a polemical, socially defining situation. By reevaluating political rhetoric and news media narratives, this work seeks to contribute to a more comprehensive dialogue about the complexities of unrest, ultimately aiming to advocate for engagement with underlying tensions and encourage more effective societal responses.

Figure 1 – August 2024 UK Rioters (Drik, 2024)

Key Words: News Media, Framing, Polarisation, Far-right, Identity Politics  

Contents 

Introduction……………………………………………………………………......................5

Methodology…........………………………………………………………….......................10

Literature Review:

-       Thompson and Roberts – The Origins of my Argument………………………….…..15

-       Discourse………………………………………………………..................................16

-       Identity and populism…........…..……………………………….................................17

Section 1: Context

-       History of Anti-Immigration Sentiments………………………………………….…20 

-       News Media Landscape ………...........................……………………………..........22 

Section 2: Framing 

-       Social Media…………………………………………………………………...……..26

-       Far-Right…………………………………………………………………………..…27

-       Stop the Far-Right Labelling…………………………………………………………28

-       Deeper Concerns………………………………………………………………..……29

-       Evaluation……………………………………………………………………………30

Section 3: Political Rhetoric and Discourse: Rioters versus Immigrants……………….31

Section 4: Identity and Populism: Rioters versus Non-rioters

-       The Necessity for Engagement with the Rise of Populism……………………...……34

-       Learning From the Past…………………………………………………………...…35

-       Identity Politics………………………………………………………………………37

Conclusion……………………………………………………………...……………………39 

Introduction  

“As social groups and classes live… increasingly fragmented and sectionally differentiated lives, the mass media are more and more responsible (a) for providing    the basis on which groups construct an ‘image’ of their lives, meanings, practices, and values of other groups and classes; (b) for providing the images, representation     and ideas around which the social totality, composed of all these separate and fragmented pieces, can be coherently grasped as ‘whole’.” 

-  Stuart Hall (1997: 340) 

Between 30^th July and 7^th August, 29 anti-immigration riots took place across the UK after false information claimed an asylum seeker was responsible for the murder of three girls in Southport (Downs, 2024). Despite this misinformation being refuted by the police, objectively presenting an issue of murder, the event rapidly evolved into a subjective attack on immigration. The 9 days of unrest that ensued gripped the nation, and all eyes turned to the media and politicians for reasoning, rationality, and response. 

Two of these eyes happened to be my own: bewildered and disturbed by the events unfolding on my doorstep across North Yorkshire. I was initially infused with anger at the abhorrent, racist violence that transpired in the days of rioting, struggling to find any reason for the scale of the far-right extremism. However, a few days in, two friends introduced me to a video of Patrick Christys who passionately addressed the media’s portrayal of the rioters, insisting that, whilst violent racism was unequivocally wrong, not all the protesters held far-right views (Christys, 2024). He argued that their legitimate concerns about immigration were shrouded under the label of far-right extremism and, although I had always disagreed with right-wing perspectives on immigration, after being fed more videos that night, my limited knowledge of the subject left me ill-equipped to reason with my previous beliefs and I was convinced of his rhetoric.

A week later, I sat down with a different friend and began recounting my previous discussion, showing him the video and repeating its recital. He was astounded and instantly began remedying me with left-wing news articles and rhetoric, desperately trying to bring me back to what he perceived to be the right side of history – and he did. I was left in disbelief at how my opinions were so malleable and how, just as my friends found solidarity in their news media, in the absence of my informed perspective, I had found solidarity in theirs. It was easy to embrace their respective narrative due to its approachable nature: from the right, the immigrants were depicted as the perpetrators, while the left predominately portrayed the rioters in the same light. I present this simplistically to illustrate how my opinions were held and shaped by news media narratives at the time. Ultimately, the media's oversimplified causal framework led me to adopt an opinion that failed to adequately capture the complexities of the situation, and I found this incomprehensive understanding to be both misleading and concerning.  

From this, I became concerned with the power of discourse, as it is produced and consumed across media platforms. Thus, in this dissertation, I have undertaken a critical analysis of three, UK-based news media platforms: GB News, the Daily Mail and the BBC. My analysis is based on a thorough review of reporting over the nine days of rioting: 30^th July to 8^th August. I analyse 150 articles across all three media sites and argue that political rhetoric and news media narratives produced and distributed a causal framework which reduced the complexities of the riots to mere short-term influences. Indeed, a GB News presenter evaluated that the rioters were “not politically motivated”, merely “bored young men”, thereby establishing a narrative that presented an apolitical problem which inappropriately demanded an apolitical solution (Wilde, 2024).  

This reductionism, I argue, obscured in-depth and long-term analysis of anti-immigrant sentiments and corresponding populist movements, often aligned with the ‘right-wing’. In this dissertation, I will analyse this particular narrative, emphasising the importance of incorporating a holistic understanding of media and political coverage, as well as the dangers arising in their absence. I perceive the issue as deeply woven into the structural fabrics of British society, threaded through sentiments of identity, perilous political rhetoric, and reductionist media framing. By acknowledging these underlying dynamics, we can gain a more comprehensive understanding of the multi-faceted causes of the August riots and the necessity of addressing these deeper issues to pave the way for a more cohesive and integrative society. I recognise there are far more complexities outside of my argument; however, I stress that my examples do not claim to illuminate the whole picture, but rather analyse the media coverage and bring awareness to the overlooked avenues that may contribute to a more comprehensive understanding.

This argument is premised in the work of Edward Thompson and his distaste for “crass reductionism... obliterating the complexities of motive, behaviour, and function” (Thompson, 1971: 78).  In the first section of this dissertation, I start the process of contextualising the August riots, defined as “12 or more people disturbing the public peace for a common purpose” (Wilkinson, 2009. 330), through a brief history of anti-immigration and the news media landscape in the UK. This background is fundamental to a thorough understanding of why there were more than just short-term influences on the causes the unrest. Secondly, by engaging with framing theory, I will present the consistent frames I uncovered across these three newspapers, which were used as an explanation for the motivations and reasoning behind the rioting. An in-depth understanding of framing theory is delivered within my methodology; however, it is important to note that it refers to how a message is presented to an audience (the frame) abstractly to “enhance understanding” or as “cognitive shortcuts to link stories to the bigger picture” (Arowolo, 2017: 1). I identified two dominant frames: the ‘far-right’ and ‘social media’, alongside three less significant others: ‘political rhetoric’, ‘identity’, and ‘stopping the far-right labelling’; the scarcity of the latter three warrant my critical argument of oversimplification. To undertake this analysis, I work with a definition of the Far-right as developed by Andrea Pirro, who argues that “it is an umbrella concept used to refer to the ‘(populist) radical’ and ‘extreme’ variants of right-wing politics”. (Pirro, 2022: 103). 

My third section will underscore the importance of discourse in this debate through Karen Barad’s (2003) analysis of the topic, arguing that discourse both permits and restricts what can be said through the influence of power dynamics. I will demonstrate how discourse in political and news media narratives contributed to the anti-immigration sentiments observed amongst the rioters, highlighting that British society was not unfamiliar with this rhetoric through examples such as Enoch Powell’s ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech and the Brexit leave campaign. Finally, my closing section will address this dilemma of misunderstanding and exclusion through an anthropological lens on the notions of identity and populism. I will argue that the riots are indicative of increasing societal polarisation through an ‘Us’ versus ‘Them’ mentality, which manifests in two interconnected ways, both deriving from identity politics (Sniderman et al., 2004: 44). 

This work connects to key debates about contemporary politics. Firstly, Eric Uslaner’s assertion that nationalist conflict against immigrants arises from an exclusivity that is “based upon a fear that the dominant culture is under threat” illuminates how the dynamic of ‘rioters’ versus ‘immigrants’ originates from a perceived sense of threat that reflects broader societal anxieties about identity loss and cultural displacement (Uslaner, 2022: 10). Thus, whilst it is evident that far-right actors participated in the unrest, I will show how this label, put forward by the news media and political rhetoric, did not accurately represent all rioters. Instead, their collective identification is better understood as a shared feeling of threat towards immigration. 

Secondly, the presumptive ‘far-right’ label only leads to a greater divide by creating a dichotomy between ‘rioters’ and ‘non-rioters’, a division that leads to sentiments of alienation in society and an ever-harder struggle for recognition. I advocate that the media and political rhetoric amplify this situation through their reductionist rhetoric, and I critique such portrayals in a desire for more nuanced engagement following such polemic and socially defining situations. Cas Mudde emphasises that this interrelated dynamic emerges because “to construct the ingroup (‘us’) one needs to construct the outgroup(s) (‘them’)” (Mudde, 2007: 63). This further illustrates how the threatened aggression exhibited by the rioters toward immigrants stems from their sense of separation, posing a stark warning towards today’s developing sense of ‘ingroup’ identity among non-rioters’ in response to the rioters’ ‘outgroup’ identity within polarising news media coverage. 

Populism is central to this analysis as it provides crucial insight into the motivations and circumstances surrounding the August riots. Notably, over one-third of the convicted rioters reside in constituencies with the highest support for the UK’s leading populist party, Reform UK, indicating a strong correlation between populist sentiment and those involved in the unrest (Duncan et al., 2024). As populism resists a singular definition, I will use Carlos del la Torre’s framework to outline its aims: “to rupture existing institutional systems, build enemies, and reduce all political and social conflict to the confrontation between two antagonistic camps… to create strong identities of the people by constructing them as antagonistic to a series of enemies” (Torre, 2021: 31). This reductionist approach to complex social and political dynamics simplifies diverse grievances into a binary struggle, showing how populist rhetoric constructs immigrants as the ‘outgroup’. Completing this notion, William Mazzarella stresses that the true “homelands” of populism reside in the mass media, where the ‘ingroup’ identity is created through: “archives of experience… shared histories… forms of life… memories… [and] social antagonisms” which, once activated, coalesce into ‘the people’ (Mazzarella, 2019: 53). Thus, it becomes evident that, for populism, the ‘Us’ vs ‘Them’ attitude arises from lived experiences articulated in the media - most evident, as I will highlight, in the Brexit campaign. Here, then, I broaden my argument by showing how the news media coverage of the riots exacerbated this existing ideological separation through the creation of a ‘non-rioter’ identity. The necessity for a more rigorous understanding of these ideological separations is underscored by the increasing prominence of populism on the global stage, indicating that it has transitioned from a fringe ideology to a significant force within mainstream politics. For this reason, it has never been more important to engage with these violent sentiments, regardless of legitimacy, because refusing to do so whilst resorting to short-term reasoning cultivates an undesirable outcome: deeper polarisation.  

Methodology

This research project will be concerned with publications from BBC News, GB News, and the Daily Mail between 30^th July and 8^th August. Due to the seemingly endless number of articles available, this shorter timeframe and number of platforms allowed me to rigorously cover nearly all their articles published in the nine days of rioting, ensuring a concise and reliable study. Moreover, during this period, the news media was engulfed with ‘Breaking News’ headlines of the riots, dominating public awareness and further underscoring the significance of this particular timeframe. I chose to analyse more right-leaning news outlets, such as GB News and the Daily Mail, because the riots were generally perceived as being driven by right-wing and far-right motivations, making their coverage more relevant to the rioters in question. BBC, the most widely read news channel in the UK, was chosen as a benchmark due to its comparatively centrist voice and for reaching 68% of over 16s; this extensive audience makes it essential for gauging influence among the UK populace (Tobitt, 2024).  

My research revolved around the frames employed by the news media to depict the August riots; however, a clear understanding of this concept is essential before I can outline my methods for identifying them. Framing theory was first applied to media studies by Robert Entman whose definition became a standard reference in frame research: 

“To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more      salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular              problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment                    recommendation for the item described” (Entman, 1993: 52). 

However, the role of ‘promoting’ that Entman elicits, suggests that framing is used for purposeful propaganda, a proposition I do not wish to claim in the context of the media coverage on the August riots. For the purposes of this dissertation, I would therefore like to reconstitute his definition of framing to incorporate Mikaela Hellman’s analysis who insists framing is “unavoidable”, because it is “necessary to ensure meaningful communication” (Hellman, 2016: 5). This stance is echoed by Dietram Scheufele et al. who understand that framing is a “necessary tool to reduce the complexity of an issue”, making them more accessible to lay audiences (Scheufele et al., 2007: 12). Whilst this may be true, I would like to suggest that not all issues require simplification because, although Scheufele et al. (2007) justifiably argue that stem cell research is an issue in need of condensation, interpretable social matters should not be reducibly framed in the same manner as fact-based, incontrovertible phenomena. Therefore, I recognise that framing does not always assume an intention to promote a particular version of reality because it is both necessary and unavoidable in effective communication. However, I stress that the frames in which these realties are situated should be carefully considered to avoid misrepresentation and unwarranted reductionism. 

I conducted a qualitative content analysis of these newspapers by examining 150 articles where I discovered 5 frames for the influences or causes of the riots: ‘social media’, ‘far-right’, ‘stopping the far-right labelling’, ‘political rhetoric’, and ‘identity’. My theoretical research put the concepts of political rhetoric and identity at the forefront of my causal considerations, however, after having read each article in its entirety, I found that the ‘social media’ and ‘far-right’ frames dominated the causal framework used by the news media. Moreover, I established the frames as categories which included any related indications. For example, any mentions of the English Defence League (EDL) as a factor were attributed to the far-right frame, whilst comments on the dissemination of false information on Facebook fell under the social media frame.  Some frames were mentioned twice in one article, which is why the total number of repetitions accumulates to over 150, and those that included ‘None of the above’ were entirely descriptive articles that did not mention the listed frames or any other causal factors.  

Figure 2 – Graph showing number of Frame Repetitions by Author

It is worth mentioning that this research does not encompass a discussion on the economic motivations of the rioters for two reasons. Firstly, because there were very limited mentions of such influences in the newspaper articles. Secondly, because, as Francis Fukuyama stresses, economic motivations are encompassed within the desire to be recognised: “to be poor is to be invisible to your fellow human beings, and the dignity of invisibility is often worse than the lack of resources” (Ibid.: 80). Kathrine Cramer echoes this, emphasising the presence of resentment in politics, emphasising that people don’t typically blame their circumstances on broader economic, social and political forces, but rather on the fault of: “guilty and less deserving people” (Cramer, 2016: 9). Fukuyama persists upon how economic decline is perceived not as resource deprivation, but a loss of identity and social status, making it easy to see why “immigration becomes a proxy for economic change” (Fukuyama, 2018: 89. See also: Bartels 2019; Uslaner 2022). For example, Brexit was predicted to have drastic economic consequences, however, the main issue for the leave voters was not economics, but identity (Ibid.: 152). My argument does not investigate direct economic motivations for the riots for this very reason; they exist because of a society that champions dignity and normalises blame, the outcomes of which are felt within the focus of my closing section: identity crises. 

Finally, the ethics review board determined that I could not conduct interviews with individuals involved in the riots; consequently, this dissertation is limited to the evidence provided by the media. I recognise that I am utilising the very mechanism I am critiquing to support my analysis, and as Sarah Pink declares, “existing ongoing media content shape the very research questions and public environment in which the anthropologist is researching” (Pink, 2016: 20). While this reliance on media sources does not diminish the significance of my research in elucidating the impact of news media coverage in shaping socio-political movements and unrest, it is important to acknowledge that the infrastructure of this study is still built from media narratives. Therefore, while this research addresses theoretical dimensions, it is equally essential to recognise that empirical research is crucial for a comprehensive understanding of the August riots to escape the boundaries of news media coverage that this research is limited by.

Literature Review

Thompson and Roberts – The Origins of my Argument

My argument was inspired by Edward Thompson’s ‘moral economy’ where he argued that scholars situate riots within the causal framework of compulsion driven by reactions to economic pressures, which he renders: “a spasmodic view of popular history” (Thompson, 1971: 76). For example, he labels Walt Rostow’s ‘social tension chart’ as “crude” for putting high food prices and unemployment as the only necessary factors to explain social disturbances; a narrative which may prematurely conclude investigation at a point of serious sociological or cultural interest (Ibid.: 77).  My research will be built upon his criticism of ‘spasmodic history’, highlighting that the August riots unfolded through more than mere compulsive, short-term influences. The news media focused on the tip of an iceberg that provided short-term reasoning to a deeply ingrained, long-term issue, thereby creating a dangerous narrative through: “obliterating the complexities of motive, behaviour, and function” (Ibid.: 78). Thus, inspired by Thompson’s understanding of how riots should be engaged with, I will constructively scrutinise the narrative of the news media to add necessary, long-term perspectives to their extensive engagement with the short-term causes. I will suggest a more comprehensive and useful understanding of why the riots happened, incorporating custom, culture, and reason, rather than reducing these violent episodes to fleeting compulsion.  

Furthermore, my inspiration was diversified by Hugh Robert’s introduction of political avenues to understanding riots, declaring that, although the breakdown of the Algerian polity was first manifested in the riots of October 1988, it actually occurred well before its descendance into violence (Roberts, 2002). Roberts highlights how the economy had “been embedded in particular political and moral structures”, leading to a growing rift between the state and its people throughout the 1980s (Ibid.: 5). I wish to reinforce Roberts’ argument by focusing on the political and moral structures that defined the relationship between state authority and community grievances to show that long-standing socio-political tensions set the stage for unrest long before the August riots.

Discourse 

Naturally, my research guided me into the field of discourse whereby the power of political rhetoric and media narratives became apparent and formed the basis of my third section. I was guided towards discourse theory through Thompson’s evaluation of how the food riots, previously discussed, which were triggered by hunger and soaring food prices that “operated within a popular consensus as to what were legitimate and what were illegitimate practices” (Thompson, 1971: 79). The significance of the term ‘popular consensus’ lies in Thompson’s elaboration in that it “impinged very generally upon eighteenth-century government and thought, and did not only intrude at moments of disturbance” (Ibid.: 79). In other words, the value system underpinning the riots was rooted in broader governmental contexts which existed as a constant influence upon societal thinking. Evidently, the pervasive environment that Roberts had underlined in Algeria is representative of the contextual factors that contributed to the UK August riots, indicating that causal structures had been developing long before the spark of social media outrage.  

This argument became clear once viewed through the lens of discourse theory. Karen Barad argues that discourse is not merely about language or descriptive statements, but rather the sociohistorical practices that enable and constrain what can be said, shaping both subjects and objects of knowledge (Barad, 2003: 819). Her outlook was inspired by Michel Foucault’s (1971) analysis on discursive practices which notes how they’re rooted in power dynamics that define and produce realities, rather than simply representing them. Ultimately, the discursive possibilities within a society are made possible by the orchestration of power dynamics. Their influence can significantly impact public perception and understanding, allowing them to define and produce realities rather than merely representing them. The earlier studies of Roberts and Thompson illustrate how the rioters were defending and asserting a set of “traditional rights or customs” and “social norms and obligations” (Thompson, 1971: 78, 79). The perspective of the August rioters also saw a large degree of rights, customs, norms and obligations in need of defence, and I will argue that the rhetoric of politicians and the media contributed to the creation of these cultural mechanisms and their perceived need of defence well before the riots began. The consequences of this serves as the premise for my final section: identity and populism.  

Identity and populism 

My closing section shows that the growth of populism is perpetuating at a rate that should not be ignored and analyses its impact on the August riots. It does so through the perspective of identity politics, which has been labelled by Eric Uslaner as: “the major problem facing governments and citizens today” (Uslaner, 2022: 2), and Francis Fukuyama as: “the lens through which most social issues are now seen across the ideological spectrum” (Fukuyama, 2018: 122). Fukuyama’s book ‘Identity’ (2018) explores the crisis of today’s identity politics where he attributes immigration as the biggest threat to national identity and, therefore, the main contributor to the rise of the nationalist movement (Ibid.: 131). For this reason, an awareness of identity within politics is paramount to a better understanding of the complexities that these riots withheld. Aet Annist contests that all forms of protest are about shifting the balance of power towards groups and/or issues previously ignored as participants assert their grievances and demanding recognition (Annist, 2020: 191). Many scholars have argued that what individuals perceive to be their inner self is, in fact, shaped by their relationships with others (Francis Fukuyama, 2018. David McCrone, 2015. Richard Jenkins, 2004). This implies that nationalism is inherently moulded by some form of collective identity. In this way, shared grievances can manifest into collective identities which, once threatened, can lead to violent episodes such as riots.

Colin Webster (2003) argued that this occurred during the 2001 riots in Yorkshire where violence towards young Asian men was seen as a result in heightened solidarity and a collective reaction against perceived threats. Here we can see an example of what Eric Uslaner notes as the ‘majority inclusive group’ (Yorkshire rioters) feeling their status was being threatened by a ‘minority exclusive group’ (young Asian men), leading to a volatile situation (Uslaner, 2022: 7). This example illustrates how, although the discourse surrounding the riots labelled the rioters as ‘far-right’, this did not, as I will show, encompass all the rioters. Instead, the rioters unified on a separate collective identity: feelings of threat towards immigration. Ultimately, what individuals perceive to be their true inner self is, in fact, shaped by their relationships with others and when this collective identity is threatened by an outer group, nationalist sentiments can fester (Fukuyama, 2018: 56).  This ‘Us’ vs ‘Them’ attitude is important for two reasons as it is responsible for both the nationalist sentiments prevalent in the August riots (‘rioters’ vs ‘immigrants’), and for the exacerbation of the situation through the process of ‘othering’ (‘rioters’ vs ‘non-rioters’).   

Colin Webster argues that the threat to identity becomes strengthened or weakened “according to its construction and reception by others” (Webster, 2003: 98). Therefore, ridiculing anti-immigration concerns as extremist will only deepen the alienation already felt and strengthen perceptions of nationalist collective identity that is perceived as being threatened and ignored. Fukuyama illustrates how populism demands social recognition in contemporary liberal democracies which fail to do so (Fukuyama, 2018: 15), and Cas Mudde echoes this in her deliberation that identity politics is more crucial to the populist than to other actors so engaged (Mudde, 2007: 63). The issue of the riots partially stems from this idea of the inner self that is not recognised, in worth nor dignity, by the outer world of social rules and norms which is evident in the riots where the rioters found themselves at odds with society after their concerns were perceived as far-right extremism. Populism clearly has a complicated relationship with the power structures it exists in, and it is within these complexities that tensions arise and should not, therefore, be overlooked on account of our own identities or prejudices. The tensions I allude to are found in the crisis of identity which establishes two relations of comparison between people: similarity and difference (Jenkins, 2004: 4), and it is within the constitutions of these comparisons that discursive mechanisms of media narratives and political rhetoric become so influential — an argument that Stuart Hall’s (1997) quote, opening my dissertation, aptly summarises.

Figure 3 - UK August 2024 Rioters: ‘Them’ (The Guardian, 2024)

Figure 4 - UK August 2024 Counter-Protest: ‘Us’ (Lawson, 2024)

Section 1 – Context

History of Anti-Immigration 

What unfolded during the days of rioting was abnormal, however, hostile sentiments surrounding immigration was not. The riots did not change the way my friends thought, rather, they acted as a catalyst for their opinions to develop. So, I questioned, what deeper influences already existed that ignited my friends’ opinions and allowed them to develop? The devastating murder of the three girls in Southport was wrongly attributed to an asylum seeker, yet, although this misinformation was quickly falsified by the police within 24 hours, the riots persisted for over a week. This raised my interest into why the riots continued to be driven by anti-immigration sentiments despite the swift clarification as an objective analysis reveals that the core issue was not immigration, but rather the act of murder itself. Nonetheless, the riots persisted. Therefore, a qualitative analysis of the news articles must consider their contextual background; if they are considered in isolation, it entails an incomplete explanation for why the riots occurred. For this reason, the following section will explore the historical and media landscapes surrounding these events. Hugh Roberts, who’s research I will soon discuss, provides valuable insight here: “It is worth comparing the nostalgia of the rioters, that is, the particular past or status quo ante they invoked in condemning the present status quo” (Roberts, 2022: 11). I wish to examine where this nostalgia comes from and the impact it has once the power of its influence is sown.  

Immigration is not a new phenomenon in British history, however, the Second World War led to a noticeable spike in immigration, leading the UK towards an increasingly multi-cultural nation (Panayi, 1999: 12).  By the late 1950’s, tensions soon rose with the arrival of non-EU immigrants and a slight economic downturn which led to the Notting hill riots against West Indians in 1958 (Ibid.:15). Anti-discrimination legislation (such as the 1968 Race Relations Act) followed and was responded to with Enoch Powell’s infamous ‘River’s of Blood’ speech which divided the nation upon his painting of English natives as “strangers in their own land” (Whipple, 2009: 717). The speech landmarked the growing demand for national sovereignty and anti-immigration under the doctrine of ‘Powellism’ which subsequently became the foundation for immigration concerns in the UK (Tomlinson, 2017: 5). Xenophobia began to proliferate with the formation of major neo-fascist movements such as the National Front (NF) in the 1967’s, the British National Party (BNP) in 1982, National Action (NA) in 2013, alongside far-right movements such as the EDL in 2009. Thatcher’s government increased nationalist sentiments, whilst Britain’s membership into the EU in 1993 saw a major increase in immigration, perhaps prompting the foundation of the UK Independence Party (UKIP) in 1993 which “effectively appropriated and made respectable” the BNP’s agenda (Dawson, 2018: 11). They gained significant popularity in the 2010’s, leading to Britain’s departure from the EU in 2016. Alongside the aforementioned right-wing movements, UKIP also collapsed in time and was rebranded as Reform UK under the same leader, Nigel Farage. Their popularity has, too, been perpetuating, perhaps given net migration was at 685,000 in 2023, over double the figure pre-Brexit in 2015 (Sumption et al., 2024), and their populist mandate was linked to and echoed the grievances of the rioters (R&WS Research Team, 2024). This summary is unreasonably concise; however, its brevity allows me to devote more space to its recent character in the riots while hopefully showing that anti-immigration sentiments in the UK are not new and borne out of a historically mediated climate. Furthermore, the relationship between Britain and immigration is, as Andrew Dawson illustrates, a love-hate relationship, and I wish to highlight that my analysis has favoured the latter analysis here as the former is not relevant to the context of the August riots (Dawson, 2018). 

News Media Landscape 

The UK news media landscape is a deeply complex and contested subject matter in the academic field. Debra Spitulnik kindly provides a framework for navigating this terrain, emphasising that a comprehensive anthropological debate requires deliberation of more than just media content; it necessitates the integration of the socio-political history of media institutions, the practices of consumption, and the culture of media production in any given society (Spitulnik, 1993: 295). The UK news media landscape today is highly concentrated and dominated by a few major conglomerates who are responsible for 90% of national newspaper circulation - DMG Media (the Daily Mail and Metro), News UK (The Times and The Sun) and Reach (Daily Express, Daily Star and Daily Mirror) (Media Reform Coalition, 2023). Furthermore, 71% of the UK’s 1,189 local newspapers are owned by 6 companies (Ibid.). This is a concerning figure when considered alongside Reeves et al.’s argument for the importance of local newspapers in the US, illustrating how they reflect public opinion, rather than create it, because they would seek to bring their ideology in line with their beliefs to maximise profits (Reeves et al., 2016: 27). Matthew Gentzkow and Jesse Shapiro also reiterate this point, noting that employees at local newspapers are encouraged to deviate from their personal ideologies to satisfy local consumer demands, resulting in an 18% increase in variable profits (Gentzkow et al. 2010: 63). However, local journalism in the UK is in peril with many local newspapers closing or moving from daily to weekly publication, creating: “news vacuums,” which have left a very large monopoly to de dominated by a few major conglomerates (Firmstone, 2018).  

The influence of these conglomerates is both increasing with the dissolution of local newspapers and decreasing with the disruption of digital alternatives as users are beginning to favour online platforms for convenience and cost. Nonetheless, news media still maintains its influence through its adaptation into the online world and its perceived role as the ‘Fourth Estate’ in Britain: a contentious role of the news media in democratic nations today. On the one hand, its role as the ‘Fourth Estate’ within democratic societies, which traditionally refers to the press and journalism as a social or political force, suggests that the media functions as an independent check on the three branches of government (executive, legislative, and judicial), acting as “the guardians of democracy and defenders of the public interest” (Amodu et al., 2014: 1). However, on the other hand, as Spitulnik evokes, it acts as a “vehicle of culture” that permeates the very fabric of society by providing “audiences with ways of seeing and interpreting the world, ways that ultimately shape their very existence and participation within a given society” (Spitulnik, 1993: 294). The UK news media is no exception to this dichotomy, an outlook shared by the UK Media Influence Matrix Report - a 250-page report evaluating the regulation, governance, funding and ownership of the UK media: 

“At its best, the UK media sought to hold power to account and to provide audiences with a range of output that would allow them more effectively to participate as citizens. At its worst, it deferred to powerful institutions and individuals, generated sensationalist and hurtful headlines and reproduced paternalistic assumptions about British society and politics” (UK Media Influence Matrix Report, 2021: 4).

Similarly, a report from the Media Reform Coalition emphasised the need for urgent reform to tackle decades of political staleness and failed regulation on concentrated media ownership (Media Reform Coalition, 2023). Whilst this research does not have the scope to evaluate this in detail, I will briefly outline how passivity in this area can significantly influence mass political behaviour. Jonathan Ladd and Gabriel Lenz (2009) analysed the impact of several prominent British newspapers switching their support to the Labour Party before the 1997 UK general election. By comparing readers of the newspapers that changed support with similar non-readers, they estimated that these newspapers persuaded a significant portion of their audience—ranging from about 10% to 25%—to vote for Labour (Ladd and Lenz, 2009). Reeves et al. highlight how “salient” newspaper ownership is in promoting personal agendas in political debates, noting that owners of UK news outlets shape the extent of election coverage and bias around particular issues (Reeves et al., 2016: 29).  

An infamous example of this persuasion is epitomised in the Sun headline: ‘It’s the Sun wot won it,’ which was believed to have swayed the 1992 election in favour of the Conservatives. Rupert Murdoch, owner of the Sun and global news empire ‘News Corporation’, pushed for this support as he had long been critical of Labour since their attempt to restrict the share of the newspaper market that any one group could have in their 1992 mandate (Purvis, 2012: 6). In excavating this evidence, I do not wish to argue that the Sun categorically decides elections, rather I am illustrating the extent of influence that news media outlets can hold and how the narratives are, at times, biased towards the vested interests of their owners. The 2024 Digital News Report for the UK noted how this underscores this concern, highlighting that news media is: “increasingly being viewed as a way to buy political influence” (Newman, 2024: 64).

Finally, I would like to illustrate a very important proposition: although the newspapers do not use their own voice to express their views, in choosing which voices to platform on their channel, that voice becomes theirs. This is supported by Herbert Gans who notes that inference of values in the news media always exists and can be found “between the lines” - which actors are reported on, which are missed out, and how they are described (Gans, 1979: 40). It is within this process that the news media may assume a consensus of values, purposefully or not. For example, BBC News platformed the voice of Farage, saying: “he does not support street protests, violence or thuggery in any way" (Grammaticas & Mackintosh, 2024). Contrastingly, GB news also platformed his voice, saying: “I think the devastating scenes we have been seeing around the country are down to irresponsible politicians” (Chapman, 2024a). Here we can see how the news media has used the words of prominent politicians in a truthful manner, yet in a way that aligned with their values and narratives on the subject through a crucial, mediating instrument: this is framing.  

Section 2 – Framing

Reeves and Vries insist that the media: “shapes the picture of the world in people’s heads,” which, in turn, creates a sense of what the most important current issues are (Reeves and Vries, 2016: 7). The ‘picture of the world’ they refer to is, theoretically speaking, quite literally being framed by the social actors attributed to it. Using the understanding of framing presented in my methodology, I will now present the frames used by the news media to explain the causes of the August riots: ‘Social media’, ‘Far-right’, ‘Stop the far-right labelling’, and ‘Deeper concerns’ (encompassing identity and political rhetoric). 

Figure 5 - Number of Frame Repetitions per newspaper, by Author

Social Media 

The social media frame is an important one to consider, after all, had the false information not rapidly circulated so rapidly across online platforms, it is likely the riots may not have occurred. Of the 150 articles I studied across the three news platforms, social media was used as a frame a total of 46 times. The BBC placed significant emphasis on social media as a reason for the riots, highlighting two particularly concerning comments. The first came from an assistant chief constable who declared that those disseminating misinformation online must bear responsibility for the events that transpired that day: "This was not a protest, just angry people, reacting to a false narrative who have their own motivations for doing so.” (BBC, 2024a). The second statement, from a Chief Superintendent, emphasised the unwavering need to address misinformation stating: “This recent activity is a clear lesson on how important it is to counter any misinformation posted online or on social media." (Ibid.). These comments exemplify the dangers of reductionist framing in the news media as simplifying the causes of the unrest to mere expressions of anger and misinformation sidelines the underlying social tensions, thereby hindering the development effective solutions. 

The Daily Mail was equally prominent in social media framing, noting: “This outburst of public disorder was initially fuelled by a false report, cynically spread on social media, that the killer was an Islamist asylum seeker” (Daily Mail Comment, 2024). The word ‘initially’ is of particular importance here as it implies that the unrest first started after the misinformation. This language may appear as trivial; however, I argue across this work that it had considerable impact upon nationwide perceptions on the causes of the riots and undermines the importance of deeper societal problems in the UK. Finally, GB News was sparse in this field, only mentioning how the “riots initially spread after misinformation” six times (Walters, 2024).   

Far-Right  

On 1^st August 2024, the Prime Minister gave a speech calling the riots: "actions of a tiny, mindless minority" and condemned "far-right hatred" (Fatima, 2024). From this moment onwards, the articles used the far-right to frame the riots a total of 60 times. The BBC used this frame in just over half of their 50 articles, for example they noticed how the violent protests “reveal [the] organising tactics of the far-right” (Casciani, 2024). Similarly, the Daily Mail, who used the frame 31 times, repetitively mentioned the actions of the “far-right thugs” that sparked the riots (Bullen, 2024). Once again, the phrasing within this far-right frame is crucial as the BBC bounce between claims that the demonstrations were “organised by far-right groups” (Binley & Johnson, 2024) and others that label all the protesters as far-right (Spereall, 2024). There is a definitive difference here regarding the organisation of the riots and the makeup of the rioters which are important pieces of information to ensure well-informed, trustworthy public opinion. 

Finally, in the 50 articles that I reviewed from GB news, none labelled the aggressors as far-right and only two mentioned the presence of the EDL, but only through accounts of other people (Bunn, 2024). Their rhetoric instead focused primarily on stopping the far-right labelling as they saw the rioters as individuals who held frustration against the immigration crisis. Nonetheless, the GB News narrative was dominated by short-term criticisms of how the riots were addressed in Westminster and, while it confronted the perceived far-right generalisation, it failed to form any consistent angle on deeper causal considerations.  

Stop the Far-Right Labelling 

Thus, my final frame is only evident within GB news articles. You need only look up GB News’ coverage on the riots to see that it is littered with infuriated scholars, academics and MPs “rag[ing] over far-right labelling” (Chapman, 2024b). 22 of the 50 articles were aimed at curbing the far-right branding with their preferred terminology being ‘anti-immigration demonstrations’ (Chapman, 2024c). One anomaly was found in a Daily Mail column, headlined: “Not everyone who took to the streets this week was 'far-right'”, although it was their only article I couldn’t access as it was under a premium subscription (Ehsan, 2024). 

Deeper Concerns – Political Rhetoric and Identity 

There is one final anomaly I would like to address here to ensure reliable research. The BBC and the Daily Mail presented considerations of deeper structural issues 17 times between them. The BBC in just three articles, noting: “political rhetoric, racism and wider anger about immigration” likely played a part, although the comment was brief and buried within the issue of social media (Spring 2024). Another article conveyed an in-depth analysis of this situation from a police and crime commissioner, Donna Jones, who called for the government to acknowledge the deeper causes of the civil unrest, noting that arresting people was “treating the symptom and not the cause” (BBC, 2024b). However, the article focuses more on the criticism she received which perceived her opinions as justifying violence. Finally, BBC home editor declared that the far right was the reason for the riots, however, he also emphasises: “the impact high levels of immigration can have on communities where healthcare and schools are under pressure” (Easton 2024). What was particularly notable in the BBC and Daily Mail articles was the scarcity of arguments for wider causes and complexities, and the criticism they received in the rare cases of consideration.  

Similarly, the Daily Mail has two mentions of a more complex situation with one being the same coverage of the Donna Jones’ comment (Reynolds 2024), which showed equal levels of criticism, and the other coming from a Lee Anderson comment – MP for Reform UK – which claimed Starmer was not “reading the room” in his failure to understand public anger (Elliott et al. 2024). GB News was more open to this rhetoric, with 8 out of their 50 articles engaging with deeper concerns. They identified immigration as the leading factor in the riots and largely blamed politicians - “Every brick thrown began in Westminster” (Wilde, 2024b) - noting how they’re: “not listening to the root cause” (Chapman, 2024d).  

Evaluation 

With all of this in mind, I want to emphasise that the intention of highlighting these frames is not questioning their integrity, nor content, but rather to unearth their limitations. Although GB news clearly held a different narrative to the Daily Mail and the BBC, all three tabloids generally maintained a consistent theme in their frames: their coverage predominantly disregarded the situation beneath the surface in favour of short-term sensationalised stories. Although GB News was more open to frames outside of social media and the far-right, their narrative focused on slating Starmer, condemning the far-right label, and criticising two-tier policing, instead of carefully constructing a framework for the deeper issues at hand. The BBC and the Daily Mail, on the other hand, labelled it predominantly as an issue of far right and social media influence with a nudge towards deeper political unrest, however, they rarely deliberated upon what this unrest was as such deliberation was widely criticised, as shown in the example of Donna Jones. One political correspondent for the BBC attempted to reason with this criticism, announcing that those in the political sphere were withholding deeper engagements because: “discussing causes might be misinterpreted as suggesting some of the unrest was justified.” (Pike, 2024). Whilst this is understandable in the context of such abhorrent violence, reducing the causes of the riots in fear of justifying violence is a decision that evokes an incomplete - and arguably false - public opinion; as I illustrate in my final section, this perspective alienates the accused by misinterpreting their motivations, thereby contributing to increasing incohesion.

 

Section 3 – Political Rhetoric and Discourse: Rioters versus Immigrants

The above frames, while persuasive, demand analysis within the framework of discourse to emphasise the influence of the linguistic environment that contributed to the August riots. My literature review underlined Barad’s compelling argument, contributing her top-down approach, which emphasises the self-perpetuating influence of politicians and the media in shaping what is permissible in public discourse, to this dissertation. Fiona Wright (2016) supports this view, arguing that political contexts shape subjectivity and cites Judith Butler’s (2006) analysis to insist that: “people can only speak and be heard through the language and cultural forms available to them within specific historical, and political, contexts” (Wright, 2016: 8). In this way, Wright’s argument convincingly depicts social change as a byproduct of dominant expressions within society, illustrating how the August riots were not confined to a specific space and time; rather, they were embedded in a broader linguistic environment that was shaped by power dynamics. Spitulnik shares a common rationale here, declaring: “Linguistic forms both presuppose and create the contexts for their interpretation” (Spitulnik, 1993: 297). Evidently, therefore, the process of news media narratives is particularly complex as they exist within social processes while simultaneously defining them. This duality consequently places the August riots themselves in a more intricate reality as their one-dimensional news media coverage is evidently situated within broader discourse and rhetorical themes such as immigration, nationalism, and sovereignty– topics that were often overlooked in the process of “oversight” (Mazzarella, 2024: 4). As Tim Newburn emphasises, the August riots require “careful and sustained inquiry”, without which, he persists, we risk falling into speculation, relying on information and our own prejudices which are continually moulded by power dynamics (Newburn, 2024). 

The powerful influence of discourse upon the August riots is best exemplified within the linguistic context of the Brexit leave campaign which Boukari and Devakumar argue fostered a “hostile environment” of xenophobia, used to “demonise and dehumanise migrants” (2024: 931). This leads us back to Mudde’s (2007) ‘ingroup-outgroup’ dichotomy whereby the Brexit leave campaign’s discourse developed an image of an ‘ingroup’ based on an identification of British national identity and an ‘outgroup’, which comprised of those threatening this identity. This divisive rhetoric was not limited to the official campaign; David Khabaz understands that it infested the news media, highlighting the three ‘salient’ frames that dominated national newspapers which covered the material in a distorted, and at times ideologically driven, manner (Khabaz, 2018: 500). For example, he interprets Nigel Farage’s ‘Getting my/our country back’ frame accordingly:  

“The phrase seems to imply that the country was ‘besieged’ by East European migrants, plagued by open borders, subjected to EU diktats and had subsequently lost its national sovereignty” (Ibid: 502).  

Steven Barnett highlights the undesirable outcomes of such reductionist framing through his perception of the referendum as an exercise that: “fuelled hatred and ignorance, and debased our politics,” and Khabaz’s frame exemplifies the divisive discourse that contributed to these harmful sentiments (Barnett, 2016). Ultimately, the effects of the Brexit campaign imposed a damaging rhetoric that capitalised on what Cas Mudde perceives as the “classic enemy”: the ethnic minority who were used as an instrument to rapidly disperse anti-immigration sentiments that bolstered the Brexit leave campaign (Mudde, 2007:69). The August riots illustrate how this discourse continues to resonate today and should not, therefore, be trivialised in the pursuit of reason.  

The damaging ‘Us’ versus ‘Them' dynamic, presented in the riots and fuelled by Brexit rhetoric, was pre-empted by Matthew Goodwin and Caitlin Milazzo’s who warned: “a significant section of the electorate” was likely to “remain dissatisfied” with the impact of ethnic change on their communities following the leave result of the Brexit vote (Goodwin & Millazo, 2017: 462). The rioters' chants in Bristol – "we want our country back" (News 2024) – directly mirror the language of this Brexit campaign, demonstrating a clear link between the pervasive political discourse and the rioters' perceived identity of the ‘ingroup’, thereby excluding the demonised ‘outgroup’: immigrants. Mike Berry attributes this to the process of ‘political socialisation’ which refers to the long-term impact of rhetoric voters are exposed to (Berry, 2016). He contests that the negative reporting in the press during the Brexit leave campaign led to immigrants being scapegoated, acting as: "a lightning rod catching discontent on a range of issues” (Ibid.), attesting to Cramer (2016) and Fukuyama’s (2018) previous argument: feelings of economic injustice originate within identity politics. Evidently, in the context of the August riots, immigration served as this same lightning rod, catching the anger and outrage felt by the rioters and constructing a powerful ‘ingroup/outgroup’ dynamic; thus, xenophobic sentiments were influenced by pervasive discourse. The riots, therefore, should not be framed within the compulsive vacuum they were granted; ignorance of this fundamental perspective, apparent in both political rhetoric and media narratives, only hinders progression towards meaningful reconciliation and social cohesion. 

Section 4 – Identity and Populism: Rioters versus Non-rioters

The Necessity for Engagement with the Rise of Populism 

The rise of right-wing populism demands engagement. Richard Fox was right when he observed that the Hindu nationalist movement, borne out of an attack on ‘Hindian’ interests, “may come to define India’s culture,” as 35 years later, Hindu nationalism dominates Indian politics (Fox, 1989: 74,76). Similarly, Donald Trump’s presidential election, whose campaign rhetoric was rooted in populism, underscores the prominence of right-wing populism in today's socio-political landscape. While my previous section established the link between pre-existing divisive discourse and anti-immigration sentiments fuelling the August riots, this section will demonstrate how, by failing to engage with populist rhetoric and identity politics, the reductionist frames of the August riots exacerbate polarisation through alienating and excluding the perpetrators.

Bradshaw and Haynes landmarked the shift toward right-wing populism in the UK at Nigel Farage’s ‘Breaking Point’ poster (Fig. 1) which moved “subterranean discourse” from social media into the political mainstream (Bradshaw and Haynes, 2023: 986). This underscores Chip and Lyons’ assertion that the “the centrist/extremist model” is used by governments and the media to portray right-wing movements as outside the socio-political mainstream, obscuring their legitimate grievances so as not to “threaten the pragmatic essence of democracy” (Chip and Lyons, 2000: 14). The authors highlight how the model ignores the work of social scientists who have found members of right-wing movements to be: “no more or less mentally unbalanced, politically dysfunctional, or ‘fringe’ than their neighbours” (Ibid.). 

Figure 6 – Nigel Farage’s Anti-Immigrant Poster (Thomas, 2016)

The model is further challenged by Agnieszka Pasieka who considers far-right communities to include “ordinary, socially established citizens” (Pasieka, 2019: 3), and Brad Whitsel’s critique of sensationalist mass media coverage which fails to consider the far-right in a serious way, rendering them: “meaningless, to the general society” (Brad, 1997: 139). Wayne and Murray exemplify this through the disproportionate media coverage given to the British National Party (BNP) during the 2006 UK general election, arguing that the overzealous attention was used to demonstrate that outside the rationality of mainstream parties: “politics can only degenerate into extremism.” (Wayne and Murray, 2009: 427). This simplistic ‘far-right’ framing is mirrored in the coverage of the August riots and echoes Zubrzycki Geneviève criticism on far-right studies which, she insists, too often transforms into: “a study of ‘cases’, rather than of individuals with unique stories and backgrounds” (Zubrzycki, 2018: 6). The resulting far-right frame the rioters received, whilst justifiable for those enacting racist violence, risks creating a dangerous environment of misunderstanding and disregard for those that did not commit such violence or identify with such beliefs. 

Learning From the Past 

The influence of political discourse on public opinion most certainly cannot, therefore, be underestimated and - given the sparse academic engagement with the August riots, due to their proximity to this study - I will draw parallels with the UK’s 2011 Mark Duggan riots to reinforce its socially defining nature. The then Prime Minister David Cameron labelled these riots as nothing more than “criminality, pure and simple” (BBC, 2011). However, Tim Newburn et al.’ s ‘Reading the Riots’ study, prompted after they found little empirical research in the narrative of police leaders, community members, and politicians, revealed a far more complex reality (Newburn et al., 2018: 13). After 3 months of data-driven research, including 270 interviews they found that the riots were driven by toxic police-community relations, austerity cuts, and youth service reductions, and contested that Cameron’s response was “characterised more by rhetoric than evidence” (Ibid.: 8). The research was criticised by many as “left-wing claptrap”; however, I argue that this dismissal of rigorous research findings is indicative of any willingness to engage with complex social issues or ask the hard questions necessary to prevent such circumstances from arising again (Bracchi, 2011). 

This example grants us the benefit of foresight in championing thorough, imminent inquiry over presumptive, reductionist reasoning. Crucial mechanisms that Starmer failed to confront in his speech 3 weeks after the riots:  

“Under the pretence... of ‘legitimate protest’... these riots didn’t happen in a vacuum. They exposed the state of our country, revealed a deeply unhealthy society, the cracks in our foundation laid bare, weakened by a decade of division and decline, infected by a spiral of populism.” (Starmer, 2024)

Starmer's focus on the ‘infection of populism’, whilst vocally rejecting legitimate grievances, mirrors Cameron’s rejection of the root causes that require consideration. Both exhibit the prevalence of Chip and Lyons’ (2000) ‘centrist/extremist’ model in today’s UK political landscape by alienating any grievances outside the political mainstream. This narrative is also reflected in the news media and risks misunderstanding the causes of the unrest, potentially leading to what Frank Lowe saw after the lack of political engagement with the 2011 riots: "more severe disaffection and more serious antisocial behaviour" (Lowe, 2013: 291). 

Peter Francis recognises that it is the “inadequacies of the political and policy response[s]” such as these that lead to the failure of understanding violent racism as a “social process” (Francis, 2007: 137). For this reason, Francis declares political responses to violent racism as being typically reactive, and I argue that this lack of engagement with preventative measures for structural imbalances leads to episodes such as the August riots (Ibid.). Ultimately, there is always a danger of a “wrong analysis, leading to the wrong diagnosis, leading to the wrong prescription,” which will only lead to exacerbating tensions (Durodié, 2012: 349). As is evidenced throughout this research, the rioters have been described as everything from ‘bored young men’ to ‘concerned citizens’ to ‘populists’ to ‘far-right thugs’, yet these attempts at classification only ensue a deeper justification for tribalism. Ultimately, the refusal of political rhetoric and media narratives to engage with the underlying issues of the August riots serves to encourage polarisation and, in extreme cases, can lead to what Mohsin Hamid once described as the “reluctant fundamentalist” whom may be capitalised upon by far-right pioneers (Hamid, 2007). 

Identity Politics 

Such incomplete discourse, which is injected into an already polemical environment by power dynamics, only serves to promote regression. As Pasieka argues, the “repulsive otherness” and “exoticization” that ensues collectively phrasing the far-right as ‘them’ is responsible for their current status and, I reiterate, this only creates deeper societal divisions that are not conducive to any means of resolution (Pasieka, 2019: 3). Naturally, what follows the creation of one group - ‘Them’ - across media and political discourse is a reason for the creation of another - ‘Us’. Lowe encapsulates this separation in his research, where he found that the 2011 riots became as much about ‘Us’ (non-rioters) as it was about ‘Them’ (rioters) through the political and media discourse that “dehumanised” the rioters as a “sick pocket of society,” thus portraying the difference of non-rioters as a: “normal, law-abiding, decent majority” (Lowe, 2013: 282). Lowe’s argument is reinforced by William Mazzarella’s theory on ‘close distance’ which he uses as “a figure for the dialectic of engagement and alienation inherent in all cultural politics” (Mazzarella, 2004: 361). This mediation, he argues, is enacted through media and political discourse and their interplay between intimate and distant influences creates a dynamic where we feel close to certain ideas or people while also experiencing feelings of separation or alienation from others (Ibid.: 357).

Be it ‘close distance’, ‘Them’ versus ‘Us’, or ‘ingroup-outgroup’, the message remains the same: the relationship between rioters and non-rioters was mediated such that the alienation of the rioters far outweighed any form of engagement or understanding, ultimately shaping public opinion and perpetuating estrangement. As Mazzarella convincingly concludes: “The acceleration and amplification of the news cycle, implacable partisanship, and cresting anti-intellectualism make it harder than ever to hold a space for the slow and open-ended work of interpretation.” (Mazzarella, 2019: 55). The implications of his comment attest to how complex engagements with political realities, evident in the August riots, should not be oversimplified, reduced, or depicted as superficial issues in the media nor politics, as doing so risks creating even more convoluted perceptions of reality in the minds of those outside of these realities. Ultimately, there exists an unfulfilled social responsibility for slow, open-ended engagement with such polemical events, and the violence witnessed in the August riots serves as a harrowing reminder of the dangers that can arise from adverse ignorance.

Conclusion

 

To learn from our past mistakes is an unforgettable lesson instilled in us from a young age, and while a critical limitation of the 2011 riots was their inability to “transform itself into a positive programme of socio-political change” (Zizek, 2011: 5), recent reports that highlight “torn social fabrics” following the August riots reveal that this lesson is still yet to be learnt (Mohdin, 2024). This dissertation has argued that the news media narratives failed to engage with the complex, long-standing issues underpinning the violence, opting instead for a reductionist framework. I approached this argument from two angles: causes and effects. Sections one through three illustrated that the causes of the riots were more complex than the media portrayed by analysing the UK media and anti-immigration context, the framing of the riots, and the pervasive influence of discourse. Section four addressed the resultant ‘Us’ versus ‘Them’ dichotomy, illustrating how the same process of reductionist framing that once fuelled populist fervour against immigration also alienated the August rioters through a lack of horizontal engagement, thereby illuminating the disastrous implications for polarisation and social cohesion.

William Mazzarella’s insight into the growing disconnect between anthropological perspectives and populist sentiments underscores the need for more engaged, empathetic inquiries into these social dynamics. Anthropologists, he contests, tend to adopt a populist stance by aligning with “the common sense of the common people,” which pressures anthropological imagination to engage with populism because: “the common sense of the common people is becoming increasingly hard to swallow” (Mazzarella, 2019: 46). This dissertation adds to that call, advocating for a fusion between empirical studies and theoretical frameworks to engage with the undesired complexities of today’s socio-political landscape that so often seem disillusioned and impenetrable.

To conclude, the importance of this research lies in its advocation for earnest equality across disciplines and platforms to consider the uplifting domain of justice, as well as the discomforting world of violence. Imperative understanding awaits discovery in the voices of the rioters themselves whose perspectives were too readily ignored in fear of justifying their violence. News media narratives must strive for deeper engagement with such polemical issues in order to avoid false public opinion and increasing societal polarisation. This dissertation has shown that delineation from conventional discourse can begin remedying the apprehension towards “Anthropology’s repugnant others” (Carey, 2019), however, as anthropologists, this demands “climb[ing] down from our ivory towers,” and starting the conversation (Mazzarella, 2019: 46).  

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